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USING THE CORPORATE PROSECUTION
AND SENTENCING MODEL FOR
INDIVIDUALS:
THE CASE FOR A UNIFIED FEDERAL
APPROACH
RACHEL E. BARKOW*
I
INTRODUCTION
A central puzzle of any criminal enforcement and punishment regime is
balancing the need for ease of administration and equal treatment of similar cases
with the desire to impose proportionate punishment based on the relevant facts
about the crime and the person or entity who commits it. The more individualized
enforcement and punishment becomes, the harder it is to administer because that
kind of fact-finding takes time. And as the relevant set of factors to consider
grows, it also becomes more difficult to get uniform judgments by prosecutors
and judges about how to weigh the facts.
Decision-makers have different sensibilities about how to assess difficult
backgrounds, substance abuse addiction, age at the time of offense, or any of the
numerous other factors that might make one offender different from another.
Some view those facts as mitigating culpability, while others see them as risk
factors for future offending. On the other hand, an enforcement and punishment
regime that relies on only a handful of easy-to-measure factors focused on the
offense itself and that dictates how the factors should be treated in all cases misses
some of the most important facts about culpability and individual differences in
blame and the potential for change and rehabilitation. A regime focused on
objective benchmarks with set consequences obtains only a superficial kind of
equality because it ends up sentencing people with vastly different levels of
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culpability to the same punishment by ignoring many of the things that matter
most.1
In the federal system, there is a marked difference in how this balance is
struck depending on whether the defendant is an individual or an entity. When it
comes to individuals, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the United States
Sentencing Commission (the Commission) strike this balance largely in favor of
administrability concerns and controlling the discretion of decision-makers,
emphasizing objective factors that are easily defined and applied. While they
have oscillated somewhat over time in terms of how strongly they have stated the
principle, since the 1980s the emphasis has been on controlling discretion. DOJ
charging memos in cases involving individuals have for decades instructed
prosecutors to charge the most serious readily provable offense regardless of
individual circumstances. Thus, prosecutors are to find the most serious code
provisions to match the facts, thus pursuing the goal of uniformity in the direction
of severity. To the extent there is flexibility, it is largely for those who cooperate
with the government and offer substantial assistance to prosecutors in bringing
cases against others. Otherwise, the working presumption is offenses should be
assessed based on the harms they cause, and the most serious charge available
should be pursued.
The Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines) likewise place an emphasis on
those factors that leave little wiggle room in how they are defined or applied to
particular cases. In drug cases, for example, the emphasis is on the quantity and
type of drugs involved as opposed to focusing on why someone sells drugs or their
role in a larger drug selling enterprise. In fraud cases, as another illustration, the
focus is on the amount of loss caused by the fraud, not the motive for the fraud
or the mens rea the defendant had with respect to that loss. In cases involving
multiple perpetrators of a crime, a defendant’s sentence can be increased based
on the reasonably foreseeable actions of other people with whom the defendant
associated to commit crime, even if the defendant never contemplated that the
other people would engage in those actions.2 The inquiry in these multiple
offender cases is objective and does not require an analysis of the defendant’s
subjective intent. The Guidelines emphasize easily counted and measured facts
as an attempt to get judges on the same page in how they sentence defendants.
While this approach may create uniformity among judges in terms of how they
decide cases, this does not necessarily involve equal treatment of similar cases
because it ignores relevant facts about culpability. Defendants who knowingly
cause harm are lumped in with those who do not even contemplate it.
The federal government’s approach to individual criminal prosecutions
contrasts sharply with the federal government’s treatment of corporate entities
in criminal cases. While prosecutors and the Commission have identified some
key factors to dictate how a company will be charged and sentenced—most
1. See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem Is
Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833 (1992).
2. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
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notably, whether a company has a compliance program—for the most part, both
the DOJ and the Commission have taken a far more individualized approach to
corporate charging and sentencing. There is a focused concern on culpability and
proportionality. And whereas the DOJ and the Commission have largely taken
the view that more severe sentences are to be preferred in individual cases, they
have recognized the costs of severity in the corporate realm, emphasizing the
collateral consequences of punishment on others and the need to pursue
alternatives other than criminal prosecutions to achieve better outcomes in terms
of public safety and overall benefits.
This Article will explore the different approaches the DOJ and the
Commission have taken to individual and corporate defendants and explain why
aspects of the corporate model should apply to individual cases as well.3 Part II
will describe the key attributes of the modern federal model for individuals. Its
emphasis is on controlling the discretion of line prosecutors and judges and shows
a marked preference for severity. Part III will explain how the approach to
corporate criminal law enforcement emphasizes individual assessment, balancing
the costs of punishment with its benefits, and considering other sanctions in
making charging and sentencing decisions. Part IV will consider why corporate
and individual cases have taken such divergent paths and explore some of the
lessons corporate practice offers for individual cases. Part V concludes by
advocating for the corporate charging and sentencing framework to be used as a
model in individual cases. There is no reason to maintain a policy that sees the
value in saving and recognizing the worth of companies, but ignores the value in
saving and recognizing the worth of individuals.

3. My conclusion that the federal approach to individual liability should look more like the
approach to entity liability shares some themes in common with Darryl K. Brown’s terrific article
comparing white-collar crime to street crime. Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the
Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295 (2001). While Brown sees a sharp divide
between white collar crime and street crime—perhaps because he is considering nationwide trends and
approaches in the abstract without focusing on a particular jurisdiction—I do not see a similar cleavage
at the federal level if one looks only at cases involving individuals. White collar crimes are punished
harshly in the federal system. COURTNEY SEMISCH, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, WHAT DOES FEDERAL
ECONOMIC CRIME REALLY LOOK LIKE? 2–3, fig.1 (2019) (reporting that people charged with economic
crimes account for 10% of the federal prison population and that sentences for securities and investment
fraud average 52 months). The Guidelines do not focus on culpability differences in white collar cases
any more than they do in drug or violent crime cases, and the trend in all of them is away from
individualization and toward severity. See infra Part II. Likewise, DOJ charging memos apply to whitecollar cases as all others, so the distinction does not exist there, either. Some of the themes Brown
observes about white-collar cases in general, however, do apply at the federal level to cases involving
corporate entities. For example, Brown notes there is a greater focus on alternatives to criminal
enforcement and the effect on third parties and other social costs in white-collar cases, Brown, supra, at
1312, 1333, and federal entity liability similarly focuses to a greater extent on those factors. I agree with
Brown that these factors are just as relevant to all criminal cases, and thus should be playing a much
larger role across the range of criminal cases, as I explain in Part V.
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II
CHARGING AND SENTENCING INDIVIDUALS
Before 1987, the federal approach to prosecution and punishment was highly
individualized and “almost entirely unregulated.”4 The federal approach
followed an indeterminate sentencing model, where judges had wide discretion
to choose a sentencing range with almost no oversight, and then parole officials
had a similarly wide berth in assessing the ultimate release date for individuals
serving sentences of incarceration.5 Rehabilitation largely motivated this
approach, as judges and parole officers needed the flexibility both to determine
the right sentence based on the rehabilitative needs of the particular defendant
and to assess the defendant over time to see if he or she was ready for release.
This approach to punishment came under attack in the 1980s from both the
left and the right sides of the political spectrum. The right saw the approach as
unduly lenient and insufficiently focused on public safety objectives, and the left
saw too much disparity from the exercise of discretion by the relevant actors.6
Both sides converged on two central ideas: rehabilitation should no longer be the
motivating objective of sentencing, and discretion needed to be cabined.7
In 1984, these ideas led to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act.8 As part
of this Act, Congress created the Commission,9 and charged it with promulgating
mandatory guidelines to limit the discretion of judges and curb unwarranted
disparities in sentencing.10 At the same time, the Commission was told to create
guidelines that would “maintain[] sufficient flexibility to permit individualized
sentences when warranted.”11 Parole was abolished, and the Commission was
required to “insure that the guidelines reflect[ed] the inappropriateness of
imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating
the defendant.”12 Congress also placed limits on how wide sentencing ranges
could be in the Guidelines.13
4. Brent E. Newton & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The History of the Original United States Sentencing
Commission 1985–1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1169 (2017).
5. “[M]ost federal prisoners became eligible to be paroled after they had served one-third of the
prison sentence” and then it was up to the parole board to decide if the person had been sufficiently
rehabilitated. Id. at 1171. Congress directed the Parole Commission to create parole guidelines in 1976,
and in about eighty percent of the cases, the Parole Commission followed those guidelines in making
release determinations. Id. at 1171–72.
6. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 7–8, 17–25 (1973)
(describing variation among judges); ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
5 (1974) (describing a similar disparity among the Second Circuit); Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at
1178–81 (describing the concerns with disparities and undue leniency as key motivators for legislators
seeking to reform federal sentencing).
7. Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1183–85.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 991 et seq. (2018).
9. Id. § 991(a).
10. Id. § 991(b)(1)(B).
11. Id.
12. Id. § 994(k).
13. Id. § 994(b)(2).
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Although Congress vested authority in the Commission to create new
guidelines, it did not bother waiting for the Commission’s analysis to take actions
of its own. It passed a series of harsh mandatory minimum drug penalties driven
by the type of drug and its quantity. It also created a harsh regime for individuals
with previous drug offenses or violent felonies.14
The Commission was attuned to the tough-on-crime political environment of
the moment when it first created the Guidelines. Initially, the Commission could
not agree on an overarching philosophy of punishment. It was starkly divided
between a just deserts faction led by Commissioner Paul H. Robinson, which
emphasized culpability and retribution, and a more utilitarian crime control wing
headed by Commissioners Michael K. Block and Ilene H. Nagel.15 At the first
meeting, one of the commissioners reported that the two sides bickered about
their ideological differences, with “Commissioner Robinson observ[ing] that the
Department is called ‘Department of Justice,’ not the ‘Department of
Maximizing Social Utility,’ to which Commissioner Block responded that the
[Sentencing Reform Act] is part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, not
the ‘Comprehensive Justice and Fairness Act.’”16 Without an underlying
philosophy to guide it, the Commission set out to please its tough-on-crime
political overseers as its central goal. It addressed Congress’s concern with
disparity by ultimately creating Guidelines that emphasized objective factors that
would leave little room for judicial disagreement in their application or meaning.
At the urging of the DOJ, the Commission also declined a model that would give
judges leeway in deciding how much of an increase should follow if a particular
fact was found by the judge.17
To further cabin differential treatment by judges, the Commission largely
rejected a focus on characteristics unique to the offender and instead emphasized
characteristics of the offense as the key facts that would increase or decrease a
sentence.18 Although mens rea was critical to criminal liability at the common law
and in every criminal code adopted in the United States, the Guidelines do not
focus on mens rea. Rather, the Guidelines model is one focused on the harms
caused, with sentences increasing as greater harms are caused by the offense.
With few exceptions, a defendant gets a longer sentence for greater harms
whether or not the defendant had any awareness that his or her conduct risked
causing those harms. Culpability in the traditional sense is thus not at the core of
the Guidelines inquiry in individual cases.

14. Rachel E. Barkow, Categorical Mistakes: The Flawed Framework of the Career Criminal Act and
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 133 HARV. L. REV. 200, 210–14 (2019).
15. Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1226.
16. Id. at 1227 (citing an interview with Commissioner Nagel, on file with Newton & Sidhu).
17. Id. at 1203, 1205–06.
18. Id. at 1240 (“[T]he Commissioners seized on the text and legislative history of the SRA to
emphasize the primary role of offense characteristics in sentencing determinations, in order [to] ensure
that the balance of sentencing considerations was not tipped too heavily in favor of individualized
offender characteristics such that sentencing disparities would arise.”).
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Just as Congress had done with its mandatory minimum drug laws, the
Commission made drug quantity and type central to its guideline regime.
Moreover, the Commission built its guidelines around Congress’ mandatory
minimum thresholds. For example, if a drug type and quantity triggered a fiveyear mandatory minimum under the statutory scheme, the Commission initially
decided that the same type and quantity should have a guideline of sixty-three to
seventy-eight months for those in the lowest criminal history category so that it
was above the statutory minimum of sixty months. A drug offense with a ten-year
mandatory minimum had guideline range of one hundred and twenty to one
hundred and fifty-one months.19
Even under a guideline regime, there is the potential for prosecutorial
charging decisions to create disparities in sentencing. To address this, the
Commission adopted what is known as a “modified real offense” approach, which
bases sentences on the offense of conviction plus other “relevant conduct” found
by the judge. The intention behind this approach was to allow judges to even out
sentences based on what defendants actually did as opposed to letting
prosecutors manipulate charges to create different sentences.20 The Commission
even went so far as to allow judges to increase sentences on the basis of conduct
when a jury had acquitted a defendant of that same conduct as long as the judge
found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was guilty of that
conduct. This regime was thus all about maximizing the sentence based on
judicial determinations, with those judicial determinations narrowly focused on
the facts of the offense and little attention paid to facts about offenders or their
backgrounds.
The Guidelines had the effect of increasing sentences for federal crimes.
Although the Commission initially set sentences for most crimes based on the
past practices of judges, it deliberately increased sentences for white collar and
drug offenses in the initial set of Guidelines at the urging of Congress.21 Over
time, most of the Commission’s changes to the guidelines—largely at the
direction of or from pressure by Congress—have been to increase sentences.22 To
be sure, there were notable reductions for crack cocaine sentences in 2007 and
for all drugs in 2013, and the Commission made those changes retroactive. But
the story of the Guidelines has predominately been one of increasing the severity
of federal sentences. Thus, the uniform application of the Guidelines means
19. In 2014, the Commission lowered all drug guidelines by two levels. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES
MANUAL app. C, amend. 782 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2014). As a result, the five-year mandatory
minimum now falls within a guideline range of 51 to 63 months, and the ten-year falls within the range of
97 to 121 months. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
20. Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 88–89 (2003); Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1224.
21. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1988); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 899 (1990).
22. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 766–767 (2005) (“Of the
hundreds of sentencing amendments proposed by the Commission, all but a handful of those
amendments involved increases in sentences.”).
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increased severity. When the Guidelines became advisory in 2005 with the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,23 many judges around the
country used their newfound discretion to give below-Guidelines sentences. The
post-Booker world of advisory guidelines has thus become one of greater interjudge disparity, with some judges adhering to the longer Guidelines sentences
and others viewing them as greater than necessary to achieve the goals of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).24
For more than four decades, the DOJ’s approach to charging and sentencing
individuals has reflected these same trends toward severity and away from
accounting for individualized differences in a particular defendant’s background
or case. In 1980, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti first published The
Principles of Federal Prosecution, which instructed federal prosecutors to bring
the most serious charges available.25 In the wake of the publication of the first
Guidelines Manual (the Manual), the DOJ, through Associate Attorney General
Stephen Trott, issued a memo to all prosecutors, stating that “plea agreements
should not be used to circumvent the Guidelines” and reiterated that they were
to charge “the most serious offense or offenses consistent with the defendant’s
conduct.”26 The DOJ thus committed to fostering the modified real offense
model of the Guidelines by not allowing its prosecutors to reduce charges.
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh issued similar instructions in a memo in
1989, stating that “a federal prosecutor should initially charge the most serious,
readily provable offense or offenses consistent with the defendant’s conduct” and
warning that “charges are not to be bargained away or dropped, unless the
prosecutor has a good faith doubt as to the government’s ability readily to prove
a charge for legal or evidentiary reasons.”27
The policy has softened only somewhat under Democratic Administrations.
In 1993, Attorney General Janet Reno continued to instruct federal prosecutors
that they ordinarily should bring the most serious, readily provable offense, but
added that they should engage in an “individualized assessment of the extent to
which particular charges fit the specific circumstances of the case, are consistent

23. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
24. A few judges use their discretion to give above Guidelines sentences, but that happens far less
frequently than judges who use their discretion to go below the Guidelines range. See UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 11 tbl.8 (2020),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/
quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2019_Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CFD-ZUQ2]
(showing judges gave upward departures in .5% of cases compared with non-government downward
departures in 2.3% of cases, and upward variances in 1.9% of cases compared with non-government
downward variances in 18% of cases).
25. Vera Inst. of Just., The Sessions Memo: Back to the Past?, VERA INST. OF JUST.: THINK JUST.
BLOG (May 25, 2017), https://www.vera.org/blog/the-sessions-memo-back-to-the-past [https://perma.cc/
MW87-C9LA].
26. Memorandum from Stephen S. Trott, Assoc. Att’y Gen. to All Litigating Div. Heads and All
U.S. Att’ys (Nov. 3, 1987), reprinted in Trott Memorandum, 6 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 342, 342 (1994).
27. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Plea Policy for Federal Prosecutors: Plea Bargaining Under the Sentencing
Reform Act (Mar. 13, 1989), reprinted in Thornburgh Bluesheet, 6 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 347, 347–48 (1994).
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with the purposes of the federal criminal code, and maximize the impact of
federal resources on crime.”28 After Attorney General John Ashcroft eliminated
the individualized assessment prong of Reno’s memo in 2003 and told
prosecutors that they “must” rather than “should” bring the most serious, readily
provable offense,29 Holder reverted back to the Reno position in 2010.30 But even
under the Holder and Reno approaches, the presumption remained in favor of
bringing the most serious charges available.
Jeff Sessions once again removed the individualized assessment language in
2017, but he acknowledged that there could be “circumstances in which good
judgment would lead a prosecutor to conclude that a strict application” of the
policy is not warranted.31 In those instances, the line attorney must seek approval
from a supervisor and document the reasons for the divergence.32
Thus for decades, and under both Republican and Democratic
Administrations, the DOJ has sought to cabin the individual discretion of
prosecutors by instructing them—albeit with varying degrees of flexibility—to
bring the most serious charges available. The assumption is that it is in the
government’s interest to seek the most serious charge it can prove, regardless of
the effects of bringing that charge on third parties and without doing a serious
evaluation of whether non-criminal alternatives might be better.
The approach at the DOJ and in the Commission toward individuals has thus
been similar: the charging and punishment practices have largely pointed in the
direction of severity and cabining the discretion of line prosecutors and judges.
III
CHARGING AND SENTENCING CORPORATIONS
In theory, the approach to corporate charging and sentencing could follow
this same basic blueprint. Prosecutors could be required to charge the most
serious readily provable offense, unless certain narrow exceptions apply, and the
sentencing of corporations could hinge largely on objective factors associated
with the offense instead of unique attributes of individual corporations. While
28. Memorandum from Janet Reno, Att’y Gen. to Holders of U.S. Att’ys’ Manual, Title 9 (Oct. 12,
1993), reprinted in Reno Bluesheet, 6 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 352 (1994).
29. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. to All Fed. Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), reprinted
in Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft Setting Forth Justice Department’s Charging and
Plea Policies, 16 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 129, 130 (2003).
30. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. to All Fed. Prosecutors (May 19, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A92W-UXN5]. Holder released a separate memo specifically addressing drug cases,
telling prosecutors that they should reserve bringing charges carrying mandatory minimum penalties for
more “serious, high-level, or violent drug traffickers.” Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen.
to the U.S. Att’ys & Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Crim. Div. (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimumsentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5ZX-TYA9].
31. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen. to All Fed. Prosecutors (May 10,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download [https://perma.cc/DNZ9-7MTV].
32. Id.
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there are some similarities between corporate charging and individual charging
practices along these lines, for the most part, the approach to charging and
punishing corporations follows a much more individualized model that is
designed to focus on culpability differences among entities and is more attuned
to the costs of prosecutions and longer sentences.
When the Commission tackled individual sentencing, it did so against a
political backdrop of intense congressional interest in increasing severity and
reducing disparities among individual defendants. In contrast, Congress paid
little attention to entity liability. Corporations were rarely prosecuted in the preGuidelines era and if they were convicted, they typically received relatively minor
fines.33 Congress took virtually no interest in this regime, so the Commission thus
had greater freedom to operate on a blank slate and think about the sentencing
of organizations separately from the baggage attached to the regime governing
individuals.
The Commission separately considered organizational defendants and issued
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (Organizational
Guidelines) in 1991.34 In many ways, the approach mirrors the one the
Commission took in creating the Guidelines that apply to individuals. In setting
the fine ranges for entities, the Commission sought to achieve both “just
punishment” (a retributive end) and deterrence (a utilitarian goal).35 The
Commission likewise sought to cabin the discretion of judges because their past
sentencing practices in corporate cases revealed enormous variation in
approach.36 And the resulting guidelines increased the punishment given to
corporations, just as they had for individuals.37
But the application of these concepts to entities resulted in differences
compared to the approach to individuals. It is conceptually more difficult, of
course, to identify a just desert for a company “that has ‘no soul to be damned
and no body to be kicked.’”38 The Commission thus had to pause to consider what
made one entity more culpable than another beyond just considering the nature
of the crime charged. It reserved its most serious fines, which are designed to be
“sufficiently high to divest the organization of its assets,” for companies that are
operated primarily for criminal purposes, such as boiler rooms engaged in

33. Robert S. Bennett, Hilary Holt LoCicero & Brooks M. Hanner, From Regulation to Prosecution
to Cooperation: Trends in Corporate White Collar Crime Enforcement and the Evolving Role of the White
Collar Criminal Defense Attorney, 68 BUS. LAW. 411, 414–15 (2013).
34. Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations:
Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U.
L.Q. 205, 208 (1993).
35. Id. at 210.
36. Id. at 214–17.
37. Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting
Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 700, 708 (2002).
38. Nagel & Swenson, supra note 34, at 218 (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul To Damn: No
Body To Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV.
386, 386 (1981)).
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fraudulent schemes.39 Among companies operating for lawful purposes, the
Commission assigns them a “culpability score,” which is designed to give lesser
sentences to those companies that report to and cooperate with authorities and
had compliance programs in place when the crimes took place, and greater
sentences to those companies that had seemed to give tacit approval to the crime
or where the offense involved senior management.40
Corporations had pressed the Commission to mitigate sentences in the
Organizational Guidelines if they had compliance programs in place, and the
Commission agreed as long as the programs were genuine attempts at deterring
and detecting wrongdoing.41 The presence or absence of a compliance program
became a centerpiece of the Organizational Guidelines. The presence of a
program could lower a company’s penalties.42 In contrast, the absence of an
effective compliance program in a company with fifty or more employees allows
courts to place those companies on probation with a variety of conditions.43 Other
civil regulators have followed the Commission’s “carrot-and-stick approach to
compliance.”44 This framework gives companies incentives to create compliance
programs and has created a cottage-industry of compliance professionals.45
Paradoxically, given that it is harder to conceptualize blameworthiness for an
entity than it is for an individual person, the general approach of seeking to tie
punishment to culpability is one that received more direct attention in the context
of companies than in the case of individuals in the Guidelines. To be sure, the
Guidelines identify harms caused as a ground for greater punishment in
individual cases. But those harms are not linked to mens rea, so there may be
instances where an individual with no idea that harm was a risk is burdened with
an increase in his or her sentence. The focus on the characteristics of the offense
is thus not about culpability in any meaningful sense because of the lack of a mens
rea requirement showing the defendant had some kind of awareness that risk of
harm was possible. Presumably, the Commission did not spend much time on the
mens rea attached to sentencing factors because it believed culpability would be
39. Id. at 232–33.
40. Id. at 233, 235, 237.
41. Id. at 236. Amendments to the Guidelines in 2004 sought to strengthen the requirements of
compliance programs to make them more effective. Frank O. Bowman, III, Drifting Down the Dnieper
with Prince Potemkin: Some Skeptical Reflections About the Place of Compliance Programs in Federal
Criminal Sentencing, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 685 (2004). But as Brandon Garrett and Greg
Mitchell note, it remains “hard to know what evidence is needed to meet” the Commission’s stated
requirement that a compliance program be “‘reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that
the program [was] generally effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct.’” Brandon L. Garrett
& Gregory Mitchell, Testing Compliance, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020, at 47, 57 (quoting
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2)).
42. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
43. Id. §§ 8D1.1(a)(3), 8D1.4(b); see also Nagel & Swenson, supra note 34, at 237.
44. Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes, Why Compliance Programs Fail—And How to Fix Them, HARV.
BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2018, at 116, 119.
45. Bowman, supra note 41, at 679 (calling compliance programs, officers, and consultants “the
children of the Guidelines”); Murphy, supra note 37, at 710 (“The organizational guidelines have been
credited with helping to create an entirely new job description: the Ethics and Compliance Officer.”).
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sufficiently addressed by the offense of conviction. But in the case of
corporations, the Commission believed that would not be sufficient because
companies are responsible for the crimes of their agents under respondeat
superior, and thus the Commission wanted to take extra care to consider the
company’s relationship to those crimes. The result is a guideline framework more
sensitive to culpability in the corporate arena than the individual one.
Another difference between individual and corporate guidelines is that the
Commission paid close attention to the fact that companies face other sanctions
for their criminal conduct. As one former commissioner noted in a co-authored
article, because companies face “substantial non-criminal penalties such as
debarment, treble civil damages, and shareholder derivative actions,” the
Commission considered how to weigh those collateral consequences in setting its
corporate punishments.46 Its Organizational Guidelines therefore advise courts
“in setting the fine within the guideline fine range” to “consider any collateral
consequences of conviction” and that such consequences “may provide a basis
for a lower fine within the guideline fine range.”47 While individuals face a host
of collateral consequences for their convictions, the Guidelines do not similarly
instruct courts to take them into account in imposing punishments.48
There are also differences in how the DOJ approaches corporations in its
charging policies. Eric Holder’s initial charging memo encouraged prosecutors to
“seek a plea to the most serious, readily provable offense charged,” just as they
are instructed to do with individuals.49 But the DOJ’s practice has been far more
nuanced when it comes to entity liability. The series of corporate charging memos
put out by Deputy Attorneys General Holder, Thompson, McNulty, Filip, and
Yates give prosecutors “a lengthy roadmap through a multi-factor analysis that
the prosecutor must conduct in order to decide on the correct resolution of a
corporate criminal case, whether it be charging, settling, or declining to
prosecute.”50 As Sam Buell has noted, “[t]he DOJ has done this, at this level, for
no other kind of defendant or offense.”51

46. Nagel & Swenson, supra note 34, at 245–46.
47. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.8 cmt. n.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
48. This is true across all offenses in the case of individuals, including those involving white-collar
crimes where regulatory actions and civil suits might be more likely. See supra Part II.
49. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and U.S.
Att’ys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter The Holder
Memo on Prosecuting Corporations], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/
2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF [https://perma.cc/CG9L-4C69].
50. Samuel W. Buell, Why Do Prosecutors Say Anything? The Case of Corporate Crime, 96 N.C. L.
REV. 823, 832 (2018). DOJ has offered similar analysis on monitor selection. See, e.g., Memorandum
from Brian Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., to All Crim. Div. Personnel on Selection of Monitors in
Criminal Division Matters (October 11, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1100531/
download [https://perma.cc/T34E-TSEA] (establishing standards, policies, and procedures regarding
determinations of whether a monitor is appropriate and to any DPA, NPA or plea agreements which
require a monitor).
51. Buell, supra note 50, at 832.
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The host of factors prosecutors are asked to consider include the “existence
and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program,” though the DOJ does
not specify any features required for effective compliance.52 In a guidance
document explaining how the DOJ evaluates corporate compliance programs, it
emphasizes that “the Criminal Division does not use any rigid formula to assess
the effectiveness of corporate compliance programs” and instead “make[s] an
individualized determination in each case.”53 Prosecutors are also supposed to
consider any “remedial actions” taken by the company; the collateral
consequences to others, including “shareholders, pension holders, employees,
and others not proven personally culpable, as well as impact on the public;” and
the adequacy of other possible remedies including civil or regulatory actions.54
Moreover, the Manual adds, the long list of factors to consider is not exhaustive
and no single factor should be deemed dispositive.55 Instead, DOJ prosecutors
are told that they need to use their “thoughtful and pragmatic judgment in
applying and balancing these factors.”56
This model is thus a departure from the approach in individual cases where
prosecutors are told to focus on bringing the most serious charges the evidence
will support and are not encouraged to use their discretion to balance the variety
of interests that might be at stake. On the contrary, the DOJ is sensitive to the
costs of excessive charging in corporate cases and looks to see if other options are
available to avoid those costs. In the corporate context, there is “broad
prosecutorial discretion.”57
That is not to say there are not parallels between individual and corporate
cases. In both individual and entity cases, there is an emphasis on cooperation.
Just as prosecutors are willing to give individuals enormous sentencing breaks for
offering substantial assistance, they are also willing to reward companies that
cooperate by helping to identify individuals responsible for criminal conduct.
Indeed, the reward for cooperating is even greater for corporations because
federal prosecutors would much prefer to bring charges against an individual
than against the corporate entity because the deterrence value is greater from
individual prosecutions.58
It is also important to note that, although corporate charging recognizes the
need to balance multiple factors and for individualized assessment, some factors
52. The Holder Memo on Prosecuting Corporations, supra note 49.
53. CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 1
(2020), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download
[https://perma.cc/W4L6DB98].
54. U.S. Dep’t. of Just., Just. Manual § 9-28.300 (2018).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075,
2087 (2016).
58. Memorandum from Sally Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and U.S. Att’ys,
on Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015); Jennifer Arlen, Corporate
Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL
LAW 144 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds., 2012).
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have taken on added importance in the calculus. In particular, compliance
programs have become de rigueur for companies seeking to avoid prosecution.
While there is “neither a checklist nor a formula” as to what that compliance
program should look like, certain features have been emphasized.59 For example,
prosecutors look for the company’s training efforts, a mechanism for employees
to report wrongdoing, how the company evaluates third parties with whom it
deals, whether the people responsible for compliance have sufficient seniority
and independence within the organization, and the disciplinary measures
companies use for those who violate compliance policies.60 Companies, in turn,
have sought to get a certain high percentage of its employees to finish training
programs or create lists of those who have been terminated or denied promotions
in response to compliance failures to show they are satisfying these concerns.61
So in that sense, compliance programs and certain features of their design have
become like the key objective facts in individual cases that drive punishment,
such as loss amounts or drug quantity. But the DOJ seems more attuned to the
limits of this approach in corporate cases. It is far more sensitive to individual
differences among companies, even in assessing their compliance programs, and
no one feature of a compliance program or metric is determinative.
IV
EXPLORING THE DIVERGENT MODELS OF CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL
CHARGING AND SENTENCING
It is worth considering why both the DOJ and Commission have taken such
different approaches between individual and corporate defendants. Some
differences are explained by the inherent nature of entity liability, including the
consideration of some factors—such as the involvement of management or the
existence of a compliance program—that matter uniquely to corporations
without an individual analog. But that does not explain the emphasis in corporate
cases on individual facts and circumstances, culpability, and the weighing of
collateral consequences because all of those factors are—or should be—just as
relevant to individual prosecutions.
One reason for the divergence might be that different theories of punishment
dominate in the two contexts. In particular, it might be that, in the corporate
space, retribution is less of a motivating factor than in the individual space.62 To
be sure, the public gets angry at entities and calls for them to get their just deserts,
even if those entities are not human and therefore not objects of a theory of

59. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 53.
60. Id.
61. Chen & Soltes, supra note 44, at 122–23.
62. Cf. Brown, supra note 3, at 1323 (arguing that whereas “[s]treet crime law maintains a relatively
stronger emphasis on moral culpability and expressive condemnation,” “[c]orporate crime policy . . .
takes place more in a deterrence mode”).
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justice in the same way.63 Additionally, commentators often argue that the
expressive and symbolic aspects of retributive justice apply in corporate cases.64
And the Commission specifically mentioned just punishment as a motivator in
creating its Organizational Guidelines.
But the government seems far more motivated by utilitarian concerns than
retributive ones when it comes to entity liability. “The DOJ has wholeheartedly
adopted the deterrence theory of corporate criminal liability advocated by
utilitarian theorists who defend the idea of using criminal processes against
corporations.”65 One can see this animating the range of DOJ guidance in the
corporate sphere, from its emphasis on cooperation and self-reporting to its focus
on compliance programs and how they aim to detect and stop wrongdoing. Eric
Holder’s initial corporate charging memo emphasized “the important public
benefits that may flow from indicting a corporation” and how “an indictment
often provides a unique opportunity for deterrence on a massive scale.”66 As Sam
Buell has observed, “[t]he Department’s commitment to [deterrence] theory has
only grown stronger over time,” with “federal prosecutors . . . engaged in a
campaign to, in effect, regulate corporate legal compliance.”67
The Commission’s focus on compliance programs is also grounded in
utilitarian concerns. Indeed, a former commissioner conceded as much, noting
that the organization “guidelines are geared toward deterrence” and the
emphasis on compliance is a “means to ‘rehabilitate’ corporations that have
engaged in criminal conduct by requiring them, as a term of probation, to institute
and maintain effective compliance programs.”68 Rehabilitation is also a central
theme in the DOJ’s imposition of conditions as part of non-prosecution
agreements (NPAs) and deferred prosecution agreement (DPAs).69
The Organizational Guidelines’ emphasis on restitution can also be seen in
utilitarian terms. The first step in the Organizational Guidelines’ framework is to
order restitution, which is not viewed as punishment,70 and any punitive fines
come after that. As one former commissioner notes, the Organizational
Guidelines focus first on restitution because “[p]unishment is . . . not the ultimate

63. See Samuel W. Buell, Retiring Corporate Retribution, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020,
at 25, 26–27 (discussing how public opinion might demand the punishment of corporations, but a
corporation “cannot be made to endure the punishment in a way that would count as retributive”).
64. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473,
477 (2006) (arguing that a greater focus should be placed on punishing blameworthy entities in order to
better exploit criminal law’s expressive capital); David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings:
Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prosecution, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1263–64 (2016) (“The
criminal law is our most powerful tool for expressing what conduct is outside the bounds of acceptable
corporate behavior” and “for expressing how we expect corporations to conduct their affairs.”).
65. Buell, supra note 50, at 850.
66. The Holder Memo on Prosecuting Corporations, supra note 49.
67. Buell, supra note 50, at 850.
68. Murphy, supra note 37, at 703.
69. See Garrett & Mitchell, supra note 41, at 58 & nn.47–49 (Describing how these agreeements
seek to rehabilitate corporations through improved compliance regimes).
70. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
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purpose of the organizational guidelines.”71 Indeed, if a fine would preclude a
company from being able to pay restitution, the fine is waived, because the
interests of victims come first.72 In individual cases, in contrast, restitution comes
last and punishment comes first.73 The assumption is that victims are to be
satisfied by the punishment itself. But there is ample evidence that long sentences
do not help victims and that many would prefer to have defendants doing other
things besides serving time to redress the harms they have caused.74 However,
that is just not something that seems to enter the calculus of prosecutors or the
Commission in individual cases even though it is a primary concern in entity
cases.
Entity liability is thus a sphere where utilitarian goals dominate and where
the government seems interested in striking the right balance between costs and
benefits of criminal punishment. To be sure, the government’s approach might
not always be the right one for maximizing benefits, and one can legitimately
question whether criminal prosecutors are well suited to make substantive
regulatory demands on companies.75 But federal prosecutors and policy makers
are far more sensitive to the tradeoffs of government interference in corporate
cases and thus work hard to ensure the benefits of their involvement outweigh
the costs.
One does not see that same emphasis in individual cases. One possible reason
might be that retributive concerns play a greater role in cases involving people
instead of entities.76 The desire to make individuals pay for their offenses and the
harms they cause is strong: the original blueprint for the Guidelines was expressly
grounded in a just deserts philosophy. Although the Commission ended up
departing from it in many ways, its harm-based focus, with incremental increases
based on offense facts, remains at the core of the Guidelines today.
To be sure, even if a greater focus on retributive justice does account for the
ways in which federal legislators, prosecutors, and policy makers approach
individual versus corporate cases, that does not necessarily mean that their
approaches in individual cases reflect sound retributive principles. On the
71. Although restitution is emphasized as a priority, in practice, fewer than one-third of settlements
and convictions against corporations include restitution damages. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG
TO JAIL 126 (2004).
72. Murphy, supra note 37, at 704.
73. Id. at 706.
74. See DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON 161 (2019) (“Many people assume—incorrectly—
that incarceration is the “toughest” response to crime, when in fact some dignified, humane alternatives
to prison turn out to be more difficult and more effective, perhaps in part because of what they require
of the people who participate . . . . These programs in New York and across the country often include
education, mental health treatment, community service, and vocational training as ways to help hold
people accountable.”).
75. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in PROSECUTORS IN THE
BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 177, 185–97 (Anthony S.
Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011); Miriam H. Baer, Three Conceptions of Corporate Crime (and
One Suggestion for Reform), 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020, at 1, 21–22.
76. See Brown, supra note 3, at 1325 (“[W]hile we use deterrence rhetoric sometimes in street crime
discussions, an expressive and retributive moralism drives policymaking.”).
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contrary, some sentences seem disproportionate to a defendant’s fault. The lack
of attention to mens rea in the Guidelines and the federal approach to conspiracy
liability are just two notable examples of how the federal approach to individual
liability fails to reflect a just deserts philosophy. There are countless others, from
the lumping together of individuals with vastly different records for career
criminal status to the way drug quantity and loss drive sentences instead of
someone’s motive or role in the offense.
More fundamentally, even if retributive justice—however poorly
accomplished—is one of the motivating concerns in individual cases, it is not the
exclusive one. Federal actors are also interested in utilitarian concerns when it
comes to individual prosecutions. They often speak about deterrence and
incapacitation as central motivators in a particular charging or sentencing policy.
But they are not as attentive to empirical information and tradeoffs with criminal
prosecution and sentencing when they engage in the utilitarian calculus in
individual cases as they are in corporate cases.
For starters, legislators, prosecutors, and policy makers are far less sensitive
to the costs of government interference and harsh policies in the case of
individual prosecutions. The assumption seems to be that more serious charges
and longer sentences are always better for utilitarian goals. But that is often not
the case. Longer sentences make it harder for individuals to reenter society when
they are released from their periods of incarceration because the conditions of
confinement worsen behavioral problems and long periods away from support
networks means people struggle upon release. That is why individuals receiving
retroactive reductions in their federal drug sentences from the Commission’s
Guideline changes recidivated at a lower rate (43.3%) than individuals who
served their full sentences (47.8%).77 Indeed, there is evidence that longer
sentences can increase the risk of recidivism.78 And while incapacitation can be
beneficial to public safety, some people would have stopped offending even
without being incarcerated. In fact, at a certain point, most individuals will age
out of criminal behavior.79 Sentences thus often extend beyond a point at which
they provide any incapacitative benefit at all, yet prosecutors and policymakers
rarely acknowledge or factor this in for individual cases. Thus they often fail to
consider less restrictive sentences, much less alternatives to criminal
enforcement.
So to the extent utilitarian concerns are motivating policy in individual cases,
the actual calculation of costs and benefits is far more deficient in that context
77. Kim Steven Hunt & Andrew Peterson, Recidivism Among Offenders Receiving Retroactive
Sentence Reductions: The 2007 Crack Cocaine Amendment, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 339, 340 (2014).
78. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION AND THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 39 (2016) (“Each additional sentence year leads to a 4 to 7 percentage point increase
in recidivism after release.”); RACHEL E. BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE
OF MASS INCARCERATION 44 (2019) (“The longer sentences people serve, the harder it is for them to
reenter successfully into society . . . One study using data from Texas found that each additional year of
a prison sentence caused a 4–7% increase in an individual’s recidivism rate once he or she was released.”).
79. Id. at 45–46.
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than in entity cases because policy makers seem to see only benefits to
government interference and longer sentences and not the tradeoffs that have
become obvious in the corporate sphere. Consider, for example, the collateral
consequences a conviction has on others. In the corporate context, the DOJ is
especially concerned with the effect a criminal charge will have on third parties.
A policy of charging a corporation with any crime, much less the most serious
one, would often mean making many corporations go out of business because in
certain industries companies would be debarred if convicted.80 The DOJ has
resisted this approach because of its concern with the consequences of that
outcome for third parties, so it adopted a more nuanced approach where often
no charges are brought at all.
But as Sara Sun Beale has persuasively argued, individual defendants also
face collateral consequences as a result of criminal convictions, and the effects of
a criminal charge on third parties in individual cases can be equally devastating—
if not more so.81 “[I]nnocent parties harmed by the punishment of individual
defendants are often less able to protect their assets than the shareholders, who
have no liability beyond their investment in the shares of the corporation.”82
Beale thus argues that prosecutors should evaluate these effects on a case-bycase basis in both contexts to help them determine whether to bring charges.83
If prosecutors were more sensitive to third-party effects in individual cases,
they would see the enormous consequences of incarceration, “ranging from lost
wages from the incarcerated individual to the costs of prison visits and calls,
which can be crushing for families already living on the edge of subsistence.”84 In
more than two-thirds of criminal cases, incarceration is so destabilizing to a
family’s finances that it leads them to struggle to meet basic needs like food and
housing.85 Children bear the harshest consequences of incarceration. Having an
incarcerated parent makes them far more likely to suffer from behavioral
problems and to struggle academically.86 This, in turn, creates a greater risk of
criminal behavior, with the children of incarcerated parents being more likely to
end up incarcerated themselves.87 The effects of incarceration on families should
thus be a paramount concern in charging and sentencing individuals, and yet it is
not central to federal policy. Shareholders fair better than children when it comes
to considering third-party effects.

80. Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1481, 1501–02 (2009). But see Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death
Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 836 (2013)
(“[T]he ‘corporate death penalty’ is no more than a bogeyman.”).
81. Beale, supra note 80, at 1503.
82. Id. at 1486.
83. Id. at 1503.
84. BARKOW, supra note 78, at 47.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 48.
87. Id.
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Perhaps the DOJ is more willing to consider third party collateral
consequences in the corporate context than the individual context because the
harm to third parties from corporate prosecutions is more easily quantified. The
end of a company and the financial loss it brings can literally be measured in
dollars. In contrast, while an individual prosecution can also bring about financial
losses to the loved ones of an incarcerated family member, other aspects of third
party loss—such as the effects of incarceration on children and their own
prospects for future offending or negative effects on communities88—might be
less tangible to prosecutors and thus more easily ignored. But one should not
mistake ease of administration and measurement for accuracy. Not counting
third party costs in the case of individual prosecutions can have a devastating
impact—financial and otherwise. Indeed, from a public safety perspective, which
is the paramount utilitarian concern in this case of criminal enforcement, the
effects of prosecuting an individual may have large ripple effects on others that
create a public safety risk.
Federal actors also fail to focus on the many collateral consequences that the
defendant faces in individual cases. In the context of corporate prosecutions, the
Guidelines and DOJ policy emphasize that other consequences—such as civil
fines or the risk of debarment—should be factors in assessing the appropriate
criminal response, with the assumption that a criminal punishment should be
reduced in light of other penalties being imposed. But in individual cases, there
is a lack of attention to the ways in which a criminal conviction brings a
devastating array of collateral consequences for the defendant. These can include
the loss of public housing, federal welfare benefits, a driver’s license, and other
necessary occupational licenses.89 In some cases, a conviction can mean a lifetime
on a sex offender registry.90 But neither DOJ policy nor the Guidelines sees these
collateral consequences as requiring mitigation through the federal government’s
criminal response. These other consequences are viewed as additions to whatever
punishment follows from seeking the most serious, readily provable offense.
Again, the philosophy when it comes to individuals seems to be that the more
onerous the consequences, the better. Indeed, one can see this in the
government’s approach to whether a case should be brought federally as opposed
to being left to the states. The DOJ’s U.S. Attorneys’ Manual notes that “the
ultimate measure of the potential for effective prosecution in another jurisdiction
is the sentence, or other consequence, that is likely to be imposed if the person is
convicted.”91 A paramount consideration for bringing a case federally is thus a
concern that a state punishment might not be sufficiently harsh.92

88. Id. at 90.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 93–95.
91. U.S. Dept. of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.240 (2018).
92. Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109
MICH. L. REV. 519, 574–76 (2011).
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Perhaps the DOJ and the Commission take a different view of punishment in
corporate cases because of a greater faith in the government’s ability to reform
companies through other means and a more pessimistic take on what besides
incarceration and harsh consequences can do that for individuals. The
Commission’s Organizational Guidelines place great weight on compliance
programs because of a view that compliance programs can make a real difference
in the risk of reoffending. The DOJ is likewise willing to offer charging
concessions and to use NPAs and DPAs in exchange for changes to corporate
behavior because it seems confident in its ability to regulate company behavior
and governance for improved outcomes.93 These requirements are often quite
intrusive into company practices, ordering entities to shut down lines of business
or change personnel.94 Yet there is little evidence to back up the view that
compliance and the conditions imposed by the government in NPAs and DPAs
are actually working to deter crime.95 Indeed, even companies are not sure
whether the compliance programs they have in place are effective.96 If a
company’s compliance expert is not sure what works, “there are very good
reasons to suppose that generalist prosecutors who are not embedded in the dayto-day operation of the subject firm” don’t know, either.97 And the DOJ itself
admits that there is a lack of empirical basis for how it evaluates compliance.98 So
the evidence does not back up a theory that rests on the government’s greater
confidence in entity cases to address underlying conditions that promote
criminality.

93. See Barkow, supra note 75, at 185–97. For criticisms of DOJ’s ability to do this, see, for example,
Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose
Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE
CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 75, at 62; Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance
Regulation Through Non-Prosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323 (2017); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate
Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075 (2016).
94. Baer, supra note 75, at 2 (noting that these agreements “may require any number of
commitments including the payment of fines, oversight by monitors, compliance and governance
changes, and promises to alter or disband certain operational practices”).
95. See, e.g., Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate
Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 681 (2009).
96. See generally Chen & Soltes, supra note 44 (noting that, of the 70% of companies with
compliance programs that attempt to measure them their effectiveness, only 20% are “confident” or
“very confident” that they are using the right metrics); Griffith, supra note 57, at 2105–06 (citing one
study in which only fifty-two percent of compliance officers stated they were “confident” or “very
confident” that they were using metric that “gave them a true sense of the effectiveness of the compliance
function” and quoting one compliance officer as saying, “[w]e just don’t know if it works”).
97. Griffith, supra note 57, at 2128; see also Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and the
Tension Between Corporate and Criminal Law, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2010) (noting the government’s
attempt at rehabilitating companies is often nothing more than “the implementation of questionable
governance provisions”).
98. See BARKOW, supra note 78, at 109; see also Tim Erblich, Measurement Matters: A Conversation
with Ethics Advocate Hui Chen, ETHISPHERE INST. (2017), https://magazine.ethisphere.com/
chen_q42017/ [https://perma.cc/2QRF-GBCB] (where DOJ’s former Compliance Counsel notes
companies should be doing better at measuring “everything” from the effectiveness of training to the
usage of whistleblower mechanisms).
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Perhaps instead the government sees that there are costs to pursuing criminal
charges in entity cases that make it more willing to see what else might work even
if it has to proceed with incomplete information. The legacy of Arthur Andersen
looms large in the corporate arena. There was enormous political pushback after
Andersen’s collapse, and when the DOJ has gone too far in the corporate sphere,
powerful interests lobby against it. In contrast, there is little political fallout when
the government is too harsh in individual cases. The pushback in individual cases
is largely only present when there is too much leniency. The media focuses on
those cases where someone is treated too leniently, and it sets off massive public
resistance. But rarely does it report on cases where an individual is sentenced too
harshly.99 Similarly, whereas those third parties harmed by corporate
prosecutions often include shareholders and employees who are well positioned
to lobby for change, the third parties harmed by excessive individual
prosecutions—family members and people in disproportionately poor
communities—often lack the resources and organization to get attention to these
issues because they are instead focused on more basic needs to survive.
The finances in the two areas also differ and may account for the variation.
The government can force companies to pay for compliance, whereas the large
mass of indigent defendants cannot finance alternatives to incarceration. This
means the state has to make those investments, and it seems more willing to stick
with prisons than invest in other options, even if those options are more costeffective, because of the politics that favor superficially tougher approaches.
There is yet another possible difference in the two spheres. The idea of
compliance is grounded in the notion that cultural change at companies is
possible. Key government decision makers seem to believe this is true. But they
seem far more skeptical that individuals can change or in the government’s ability
to intervene through mechanisms other than incarceration to get them on a path
to better outcomes. To be sure, we are now seeing some alternative models in
federal courts around the country where individuals are diverted to drug or other
treatment programs instead of being charged criminally.100 But these are the rare
exception rather than the dominant approach, and they are reserved for the
lowest-level offenses. In contrast, alternatives to criminal prosecution—whether
through no involvement by criminal prosecutors at all or through the use of NPAs
and DPAs so no charges ultimately get brought—are widely sought for entities
and they are used even in cases of serious and widespread misconduct.101

99. See BARKOW, supra note 78, at 105–24.
100. See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE-TO-INCARCERATION COURT
PROGRAMS (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2017/20170928_alternatives.pdf [https://perma.cc/45HG-NPGN]. DOJ policy also allows
prosecutors to consider alternatives to prosecution, including pre-trial diversion. Dept. of Just., Just.
Manual, § 9-27.250 (2018).
101. For an excellent overview, see generally GARRETT, supra note 71.
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V
CONCLUSION: USING CORPORATE CHARGING AND SENTENCING AS A MODEL
While the DOJ and the Commission may not yet see the value of applying
their approach to corporations in cases involving individuals as well, the approach
they take in corporate cases is, in fact, a helpful model for individual cases. As
Judge Emmet Sullivan has noted, “people are no less prone to rehabilitation than
corporations . . . [a]nd society is harmed at least as much by the devastating effect
that felony convictions have on the lives of its citizens as it is by the effect of
criminal convictions on corporations.”102 There should be more flexibility in how
individuals are assessed instead of reflexively assuming the most serious charge
is the appropriate one. Individual culpability should be a central inquiry, as
should the prospect of rehabilitation. Just as in corporate cases, seeking criminal
charges and punishment in individual cases has real costs that should be
considered. Longer sentences can lead to recidivism and harm public safety.
Incarceration can have devastating effects on families and third parties.
Collateral consequences of convictions for individuals should be weighed when
thinking about the right punishment for an individual. Taking into account these
factors will lead to charges and sentences that are better calibrated to improve
public safety—the ultimate utilitarian goal.
There is no reason the approach to corporate prosecutions and sentencing
cannot work in individual cases. The solutions here are all within the existing
framework of DOJ and Guideline policy and just require taking the approach
currently used for entities and seeing its virtue in individual cases as well.103 There
just has not been the will to do so, perhaps because key federal policy makers
have been blind to the downsides of their approach in individual cases and have
not faced political pushback for the status quo. In contrast, wealthy and powerful
corporate actors have lobbied hard for more careful treatment when it comes to
pursuing entities. One cannot deny the big difference in the politics of the two
settings. But where the federal government has been forced to confront the costs
of criminal prosecution and the harm it can bring because of corporate lobbying
for a closer look, it has opted for a more a nuanced framework. The key is to get
those concerned with individuals to ask prosecutors and the Commission to learn
from their own practices in corporate cases and see that there is a better model.
It will likely take grassroots efforts to bring about this change. In particular,
it would require a change in the leadership at the DOJ and the Commission to
recognize this as a needed shift worth making. That means the president needs to
rethink who gets appointed to critical positions at the DOJ and in spots on the
Commission. As candidates for the presidency on the left and right have started

102. See United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 46 (D.D.C. 2015).
103. For a broader set of reforms modeled on an approach to economic crime, see Brown, supra note
3, at 1345–57, arguing for community policing, drug treatment courts, and restorative justice models.
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to emphasize criminal justice reform as part of their agenda,104 it may become
more politically palatable to re-think the divergence between cases with
corporate and individual defendants. If the goal is public safety or proportionate
punishment, corporate prosecution provides a model well worth emulating in
individual cases.

104. President Trump ran a Super Bowl ad touting his criminal justice reform achievements, and
candidates for the 2020 Democratic nomination also touted criminal justice reform as part of their
agendas.

